Abstract: This paper investigates how the families' cultural milieu (the inherited cultural capital) has influenced the status attainment process in the Hungarian society in the pats decades. Two alternative hypotheses are tested. On the one hand cultural reproduction theory (based on P. Bourdieu's hypothesis) suggests that cultural factors play a significant role in the reproduction of the social inequalities. On the other hand, however Paul DiMaggio and others assume that cultural capital is more a means of social mobility and can play a compensatory role, helping lower status children achieve above their parents. So far in Hungary the former function of cultural capital has been believed to be dominant. Our analyses show, however, that cultural reproduction and cultural mobility have both been present in this society. In fact, we find that until the 1960s children with the least educated parents could benefit the most from the family's cultural investments. Since then, the two processes have been of similar importance. Cultural assets have both helped the upper classes to maintain their existing positions but they have also provided a possible source for those occupying lower positions in the social hierarchy to support their children getting forward.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper two alternative hypotheses concerning the relationship between cultural capital and achieved social position will be tested. Pierre Bourdieu's theory of cultural reproduction suggests that it is the social elite that benefits the most from cultural assets. By passing them over to their offspring, Bourdieu suggests, they ensure the inheritance of their privileges from generation to generation. On the other hand, the hypothesis of cultural mobility (that can be traced back to Paul DiMaggio's works) suggests that cultural assets can provide an opportunity for the lower classes to compensate for their drawbacks of other kinds. According to this idea the upper classes would find alternative ways to maintain their privileged positions.
Research in Hungary has so far focused on the former process and described cultural capital as a tool in the reproduction of social inequalities. Using TÁRKI's social mobility data from 1992 in this study I will show that the two mechanisms operated jointly in the twentieth century Hungary: cultural capital played a role in both cultural mobility and reproduction. I will also show that it is the children of least educated parents who could gain the most from an intense cultural investment. Looking at the historical trends I find that the reproductive function of cultural capital only appeared in the fifties.
CULTURAL REPRODUCTION
In the sociology of educational inequalities it is a well-known thesis -tested many times empirically -that the achieved level of education is not independent from the individual's social background. Although the correlations vary greatly, in most societies children with more educated parents, or with parents of high social status have better chances to achieve higher levels of education and to get into more prestigious occupations.
In his explanation for these tendencies Pierre Bourdieu suggests that it is mainly through the cultural capital that social background can influence the achieved social position (Bourdieu 1973 (Bourdieu , 1978 (Bourdieu , 1986 . According to his thesis of cultural reproduction, familiarity with the so-called high (or legitimate) culture -that can only be acquired in the family -provides capabilities, skills, taste and style that are highly valued in the world of education. In Bourdieu's theory the real function of the school is not to transmit knowledge but to maintain and reproduce the existing system of social inequalities. This is only possible with upper class children being easy to distinguish through their cultural assets: that is with the possession of cultural capital being a trustful sign of privileged social background.
Bourdieu assumes that these assets are mostly (or even exclusively) available to children of the upper classes. There are various motivations behind this assumption. Firstly, members of these classes possess a substantial amount of cultural assets themselves. Consequently, familiarizing their children with these values is not a problem for them. Secondly, handing over and acquiring cultural capital requires substantial material assets as well -another asset more easily available for families in the upper classes. Furthermore, transmitting cultural capital to the offspring is a time-consuming activity and -according to Bourdieu -it is again the upper classes that are better endowed with time. Finally, investing into cultural capital can be a risky process and the more educated are better skilled in estimating and handling this risk.
Bourdieu does not simply suggest that for all these reasons the primary function of cultural capital is the reproduction of social inequalities but he also assumes that this function is getting increasingly significant over time. If his theory proved to be true, practical implications would include a strong critique against educational policies that aim at reducing social inequalities within the existing educational system.
Empirical studies designed for testing Bourdieu's suggestions typically involved statistical modeling. In the casual models estimated the dependent variable is the level of education (or possibly some other measure of educational achievement), and the explanatory variables always include some indicator of cultural capital. The latter is usually constructed from measures of childhood cultural activities (visiting theatre, museums, concerts; reading books) as well as of possession of cultural objects (such as books, instruments, writing-table). However, the specific ways of operationalization as well as the methods applied in modeling vary to such an extent in these studies that comparing results becomes fairly troublesome.
Cultural capital was found to play a role (of a smaller or bigger scale) in status-reproduction on Dutch, American and Hungarian data by Ganzeboom (1986) ; on a Dutch sample by De Graaf (1986 , 1989 ; on Czechoslovakian, then on Czech, Slovakian, Dutch and Hungarian data by Mateju (1988 Mateju ( , 1990 . Similar results were found in various analyses carried out solely on Hungarian data by Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Róbert (1990) , Róbert (1991) and Blaskó (1998) . At the same time these researches did not support the assumption that cultural capital is playing a non-decreasing role over time.
A joint characteristic of the analyses listed is the logic followed in the models, that is: "social background Z cultural capital Z achieved social position". When interpreting their results, the authors assume without exception that by finding a significant positive correlation between the factors included, they have confirmed Bourdieu's thesis of cultural reproduction. However, the positive parameters in these models do not necessarily imply that it is the upper classes that can benefit the most from the cultural assets. In fact, using the specifications applied in these studies there is nothing we could say about the cultural capital being more or less profitable for one social group or the other -the design at hand typically assumes equal effects in the various classes.
It is however not only the technical aspects of testing the theory that I shall be looking at in what follows. I introduce some more theoretical motivations of the assumption that cultural capital does not have solely reproductive functions. As we shall see, this direction of thinking is not without empirical base either.
CULTURAL MOBILITY
It was Paul DiMaggio who first called the theory that builds on bases similar to those of Bourdieu's thesis, but comes to a conclusion very different from his, the model of cultural mobility. The idea here is that cultural capital does indeed play an important role in shaping social inequalities, but it does so by improving the opportunities of those from lower classes rather than by promoting upper classes to inherit advantageous positions. Following this idea, DiMaggio (1982) , Ashaffenburg and Maas (1997) and also De Graaf and his colleagues (2000) are looking at the same pair of alternative hypotheses.
1 H1 -The model of cultural reproduction. Returns to cultural capital are greater for students from the upper classes and smaller for students from the lower classes. H2 -The model of cultural mobility. Cultural capital plays a more important role in the mobility of lower status children than it does in the status-reproduction of the upper classes. In other words, cultural capital can have a bigger impact on the status-attainment process of those from the lower classes.
In his 1982 study the starting point for DiMaggio was the suggestion that in modern, Western societies that are built on market economies, the traditional status order has corroded, borders that used to separate status groups have become fluid. For this reason the importance of demonstrating shared status culture is increasing. However, it is not solely in the family any more where symbols of status culture can be acquired. "In such a fluid world childhood experience and family background may only modestly and partially determine a person's stock of cultural capital " (1982: 190) . Since group membership can be corrected later on by increasing cultural capital, for upwardly mobile lower class students it is a rational -and also fruitful -strategy to get involved in middle-class cultural activities. The main point is then that cultural capital does not only have a role in reproducing but also in modifying social status. DiMaggio even assumes that the latter function can outshine the former.
However, it is important to note that in DiMaggio's thesis it is not exactly Bourdieu's cultural capital that has such a compensatory function, but a cultural asset that can even be independent from the social background and might be acquired fully later on, in the late teenager years. Accordingly, in his study on American data from 1960 DiMaggio measured cultural capital by cultural involvement and cultural attitudes of students of 16-17 years old. He found that cultural capital operationalized this way correlates positively with school grades even if abilities are controlled for. To test the hypothesis of cultural mobility, DiMaggio divided the sample into three parts by the fathers' level of education for girls and boys separately.
He found that in the case of girls the impact of cultural capital on school grades is increasing with the educational level of the father. In other words his findings show that higher status girls benefit more from cultural capital than lower status girls dowhich is the assumption of the classic cultural reproduction theory. However, for boys just the opposite seems to be the case. The lower the status of the father the more the benefit from increasing cultural capital while attending secondary school.
The concept of cultural capital De Graaf, De Graaf and Kraaykamp are using in their study (2000) is closer to the original notion of Bourdieu. They suggest that a factor of special importance is the mobilizing impact of cultural resources acquired within the family. Similarly to DiMaggio, they assume that the main function of cultural assets is a compensatory one. Parents in the lower classes that are poor in other resources (such as material ones) might attempt to compensate their offspring by providing them with a high level of cultural capital. This idea is based on their finding that there is no particularly strong correlation between the level of cultural assets and other indicators of social position. They show that also parents with low education, lower prestige jobs or poor material circumstances can -sometimes -provide a rich cultural environment for their children. Promoting social mobility through cultural resources can be especially efficient since it can be a way to reduce the symbolic distance between the family (where the parents themselves have low education levels and therefore find the values and expectations of school strange) and the school. By providing their children with the necessary cultural resources, parents can make the language, the way of thinking and the relation to books that is expected and also rewarded by the school more familiar for them.
Similarly, the authors do not believe that members of the elite classes tend to be especially culturally active. According to De Graaf and his colleagues this is not at all a necessary precondition for the successful maintenance of their social position. Other resources of theirs -very importantly their social capital -can generously compensate for the possible deficiencies in their cultural activities. Attaining a high level of education is usually a norm in the social network of the parents, and these extensive networks are also very efficient in providing information on school and educational opportunities. Furthermore, parents with high qualifications tend to be familiar with the world of schools and the academic sphere even without being culturally active themselves.
To test their theory, the authors estimated regression models with interactions effects.
2 Their results suggest that cultural capital and especially reading habits in the Netherlands operate as a mobilizing asset in the first place: the interaction effect of parental education and cultural capital (as measured by the reading habits of the parents) had a significant, negative impact on the respondent's years of schooling. No similar differences by social groups were found in the influence of material capital.
Although the two studies described above do not only provide empirical tests for the idea of cultural mobility but they are also theoretically underpinned, it is worthwhile looking at a few further explanations that might stand behind the findings.
A fundamental difference between the argument of Bourdieu and that of both DiMaggio and De Graaf concerns the consistency of social status. In his theory, Bourdieu assumes that social status is multidimensional and the dimensions are to a large extent consistent with each other. Members of the upper classes -being highly qualified themselves -transform part of their plentiful economic assets into cultural capital which their offspring can inherit. Similarly, those in the lower classes who are poorly educated do not possess the necessary amount of economic capital that could be efficiently transformed into cultural capital -therefore their children will also remain poor in cultural assets.
Opposing this view, DiMaggio speaks about diffuse status groups. De Graaf and his colleagues directly disagree with the idea of status consistency. By suggesting that cultural capital is not determined by social status, they build their theory on the (general) existence of inconsistent statuses. Even though they do not deny that in the unequal modern societies there is a high level of correlation between the advantages on the one hand and disadvantages on the other, they emphasize that these correlations are 2 Cultural capital was measured by two indices: one for the parents' participation in cultural activities and the other for the reading habits of parents. The respondent's years of schooling was applied as the dependent variable in the models. Among the independent variables -beside the two indices of cultural capital -parents' education, the father's ISEI code and a measure for the parents' wealth were also included. Age and gender of the respondent, and whether the family was a single-parent one were also controlled for. Interactions between parental level of schooling and the indices of the various forms of capital were introduced to test the alternative hypotheses of cultural reproduction and cultural mobility.
far from perfect. Advantages in one dimension do not necessarily imply advantages in the other.
As it is explained in their study, status inconsistency can present itself in two basic forms in the case of cultural capital. One is that parents of good qualification and/or of prestigious occupations and/or of good economic circumstances pass over a relatively low level of cultural capital. In other words they do not participate actively in cultural activities and do not provide opportunities of this kind to their children either. The other case is when the inconsistency appears in the form of less qualified parents and/or those in low status jobs and/or those in poor economic circumstances manage to increase the level of cultural asset passed over to the offspring. Empirically, the existence of these kinds of status inconsistencies can be seen from the fact that the amount of cultural capital is socially determined to a moderate level only. Usually no more than 30-40% of the cultural capital's total variance can be explained by socio-economic measures.
Considering these findings the question arises: how will the social position of families of inconsistent statuses work out in the future? Will cultural capital possibly start some kind of a status-adjustment process, whereby other components of the status (educational, occupational, economic, power or the residential situation) 'adjust themselves' to the level of cultural assets? Slightly reformulating the findings of De Graaf and others we can say that a positive answer to this question was found in their study. They also find that this adjustment-effect does not only exist but it is even stronger than the affect cultural capital can play in families with more consistent statuses.
Social mobility generated by a status-inconsistency of the second type, when compared to other resources the family is relatively rich in cultural capital, can also be interpreted as anticipatory socialization -a notion developed by R. K. Merton. Applying Merton's theory to the idea of cultural mobility, families that invest culturally more in their children than other families of otherwise similar social standing do, are in fact helping anticipatory socialization of their offspring. Consciously or unconsciously these parents select a reference group of higher social position than their own and adjust their cultural activities to them. For the child such a preliminary adjustment can not only make it easier to enter the selected status-group, but it might also help integration into the new group, to stabilize his or her position in it. By the time of the entry, the newcomer has assimilated to the group in at least one very important dimension in this way (Merton 1980: 544-545) . If this is indeed the case, we can formulate our starting question as follows: to what extent can this kind of anticipatory socialization fulfill its main role, which is to support the individual's entry into the reference group?
CULTURAL REPRODUCTION AND CULTURAL MOBILITY IN HUNGARY
In Hungary empirical evidence is available only on the process of cultural reproduction. With no exception, these analyses found that cultural capital does play some role in the processes of attaining a certain level of education and/or the occupational position. 4 Results show quite clearly that despite the equalizing ideology and the social policies operating in the socialist Hungary, correlation between the social background and achieved social status remained high. The fact that the educational system did not stop rewarding students with a high level of cultural capital explains this phenomenon to a great extent. At the same time, the impact of the material assets was systematically found to be much less significant than that of parental education and cultural activities.
As far as trends over time are concerned, the picture is far from clear. The two relating studies provide different results in this respect. Róbert (1991) found a temporary peak-time in the impact of cultural resources in the fifties. According to his findings, the drastic policies aiming at ceasing material inequalities had for a while increased the importance of cultural inequalities even further. On the other hand Ganzeboom and his colleagues (1990) found a continuously decreasing trend in the importance of the cultural resources in the 20th-century Hungary.
Whether the significant role cultural capital has been playing in the status-attainment process in the past decades in Hungary was to help members of the elite to reproduce their advantages, or the lower classes who could make use of the process, one cannot tell from the existing empirical evidences. In the following I shall only formulate some hypotheses relating to this question.
We know from an extensive study on social inequalities that the level of status inconsistency was considerable in socialist Hungary (Kolosi 1984) . However, it is also clear from the study that among the numerous aspects of social position it was exactly the cultural dimension that showed the highest level of consistency with the rest.
5
Using the same data Róbert analyzed the social status of the respondents' parents as a multidimensional category (1986) . He found that even at times when respondents of the 1981 survey were teenagers, cultural factors were the strongest determinants of social (that is occupational, material and residential) inequalities.
6 Utasi (1984) used indicators of lifestyle to distinguish between social groups and among the nine areas of lifestyle 7 she was looking at, cultural consumption -together with the supply of amenities in homes -proved the strongest differentiating factor (1984).
These results indicating the relatively high consistency between cultural activities and other aspects of social status suggest that cultural assets could not play a significant role in the upward mobility of the lower classes, or at least it could only work for small groups of the society. We might also conclude that at the times when material symbols of status-group belonging (income, consumption, wealth) were radically suppressed, it became increasingly important for the upper classes to demonstrate their prestige through cultural symbols.
However, we also know that members of the elite in Hungary too could successfully keep their privileged positions in various respects. Very importantly, they remained rich in social capital. As Angelusz and Tardos has shown (1991) using data from a research conducted in 1986, those from the higher social strata did not only have substantially more extensive networks than others did, but -due to the homophile nature of their contacts -they also made their contacts among those with similar social standing. They were found to be particularly rich in weak ties, ties that are very efficient in providing functional (or "instrumental") support to those involved. (Lin 1997) . Based on these considerations, we can hypothesize that just like in the Netherlands, cultural capital did not remain the only or even the most important instrument of the reproduction of advantages. On the contrary, we cannot rule out that educated parents could successfully usher their children towards the 'right' choices, even without any specific cultural effort but merely through their closer linkages to academia and their networks. If this were indeed the case, we would expect the cultural mobility model to operate in the Hungarian case.
DATA AND MODELING
To test the two alternative hypotheses in the Hungarian case I used TÁRKI's social mobility data from 1992. For the purposes of the analysis, those between the age of 24 and 65 were selected (n=2095). Respondent's level of education -the dependent variable of the models -was measured by the number of years spent in school. As indicators of the social background occupational prestige of the father and educational level of both parents were included. Cultural capital and economic capital were represented by two separate indicators.
To answer our main question about the relevance of the cultural mobility and the cultural reproduction theories, interaction effects between parental education and the indicators of the two forms of capital were introduced into the models. De Graaf and his colleagues followed a similar method. Creating a (quasi-) continuous variable from the measure of the highest level of schooling achieved by the parents. They interacted this measure with the continuous measures of the cultural capital on one hand and that of the economic capital on the other. This way however they implicitly assumed a linear relationship between the impact of the various forms of capital and the parents' level of education. Such a specification can only lead to three possible conclusions. The first is a capital effect continuously increasing with the level of parental education -that would suggest cultural reproduction being in operation. Secondly, a continuous decrease of the impact would suggest the alternative process of mobility to be stronger.
Finally, it is of course also possible that no interaction effect is found, implying no differences by schooling in the way various forms of capital operate in the process of (re)producing the structure of social inequalities.
Unlike De Graaf et al. (2000) , I decided to handle parental education as a categorical measure and included the categories as dummy variables in the interactions. My reason for this was that I aimed at identifying possible non-linear patterns of the cultural impact, too. In other words I wanted to distinguish more clearly between the ways cultural capital operates on the various levels of family background. I expected a more complicated pattern because of the uncertainties and contradictions in the arguments for one or the other hypothesis in the Hungarian case.
To measure the educational level of the parents the following categories were used: (1) primary schooling not completed; (2) completed primary school (8 years); (3) vocational school; (4) secondary school final exam; (5) higher education degree. Where father and mother had different levels of schooling, the higher level was taken into account since I assumed a bigger impact on the offspring's schooling from the more educated parent. Because of case-number restrictions, unfortunately it was not possible to distinguish between university degrees on the one hand and higher education degrees of other types on the other. This is very likely to be a loss since we do not only know (even from this sample) that there is a significant difference between the cultural consumption of the two groups (in favor of those with a university degree) but it is also clear that their children follow very different educational routes (Andor and Liskó 2000; Róbert 2000) .
Occupational prestige of the father was estimated with the prestige-scale created by Rózsa Kulcsár. The question on the father's occupation related to the time when the respondent was 14. Due to the high number of housewife mothers, mothers' occupation was not included in the model.
The indicator of economic capital was created from the following items. Whether or not at his/her age of 14 (1) in the respondent's home each person slept in a room; the home (2) had electricity; (3) had a bathroom; (4) was heated centrally either by gas or by electricity; (5) had a refrigerator; (6) had a washing machine; (7) the family possessed a car; (8) area per family members in the flat was over 8 square-meters; (9) they had cheese at least once a week; (10) they never had to eat vegetables only; (11) they never had to remain hungry for financial reasons. To eliminate the impact of the general increase in the living standard during the period studied, z-scores for each item were calculated and aggregated for eight different age-cohorts separately. The sums of the z-scores were also normalized for each cohort. The resulting index was then applied as the measure of economic capital in the models.
To construct the measure of cultural capital I applied a similar method. Here the following items were included. (1) number of books the parents possessed; whether the parents had (2) any record of classical music; (3) an encyclopedia; (4) any art books; (5) any books in foreign languages; (6) whether the father used to read any fiction; (7) whether the mother used to read any fiction; whether the parents at least occasionally visited (8) a theatre; (9) museum; (10) classical concert. It was also taken into account whether the respondent in his/her childhood (11) read any fiction; (12) visited a theatre; (13) visited a museum; (14) visited a classical concert (15) learned a foreign language outside the school (16) number of books owned by the child. I aimed to cover a broad range of cultural activities: outgoing activities as well as those that can be done at home; parental activities as well as activities of the child. Although the formulation of the questions that relate to the respondents' childhood activities does not specify a standard time that the responses should refer to, the general logic of the questionnaire suggest that 'childhood' is around the time when the respondent was 14. Therefore the measure on cultural capital can be handled as a measure of the Bourdieuian concept. Table 1 shows the relationships between the education of the parents and the amount of (economic and cultural) capital inherited by the respondent. As it can be seen, parental education has a strong, statistically significant impact on both types of resources: a higher level of education implies more cultural capital as well as more economic assets. It is however the cultural capital that is more strongly determined by the parents' educational level. This is partly because of the 'natural' and general correlation between education and cultural assets (as suggested by Bourdieu) and also because of the strong consistency between cultural activities and other factors of the social status in the Hungarian case. This latter explanation is also supported by another finding which shows that it is not only parental education that correlates more strongly with the cultural capital than it does with the economic assets but also the father's occupation.
In each case, the difference between two consecutive groups as defined by the parents' level of education is statistically significant in terms of the cultural as well as of the economic assets 8 . Concerning cultural capital, more marked differences can be found at the higher levels of education. Differences in cultural efforts between those without completed compulsory schooling, those with compulsory schooling only and those with vocational schooling are statistically significant but not really substantial. However, it makes a sound difference to be born in a family where parents have a secondary school final exam rather than vocational schooling only, or to have graduated parents rather than parents who never went further to higher education. In the following we shall be looking at the question how these cultural (and economic) advantages can be converted into educational success. We can formulate the hypotheses to be tested in the terminology of regression analyses as follows.
H1 -Model of cultural reproduction:
The strongest interaction effect between cultural capital and the parents' education can be found in the group of those, whose parents have a higher education degree, while it will be the weakest -possibly non-significant -in the least educated group. In groups with middle-level education the parameters will have values between the two extremes and they will be increasing as we move towards those with higher education.
H2 -Model of cultural mobility: The strongest interaction effect between cultural capital and the parents' education can be found in the group where parents never completed compulsory school. It will be the weakest -possibly non-significant -in the most educated group. At groups with middle-level education the parameters will have values between the two extremes and they will be decreasing as we move towards those with higher education. Table 2 in a two-variable approach. Groups defined by the parents' education were divided further according to the amount of (cultural and economic) capital inherited. We can observe very clearly, that cultural capital plays an important part in supporting educational success. Moving from those poorest in cultural assets towards the richest ones, number of years spent in school shows increase whichever level of parental education we are looking at. Correlation coefficients calculated for each social-background group separately also suggest, that cultural capital plays a notable role in shaping the educational career of the offspring in every segment of the society. This finding seems to support the cultural mobility hypothesis, although not as strongly as the similar tests of De Graaf and his colleagues. 9 In our case the non-linear tendency in the correlation coefficients appear to justify our decision to look at parental education as a non-continuous variable.
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION

Associations between inherited assets and achieved educational level are shown in
Further investigation of the data in Table 2 also shows that the compensatory function of cultural capital is rather restricted and appears in providing relative advantages only. Children whose parents did not complete compulsory schooling can not expect a more successful educational career even if they make extreme efforts to invest into cultural assets than children with graduated parents but with relatively poor cultural activities can. Also, a similar intensity of cultural consumption will take a child with educated parents much further in the system of inequalities than it will someone with poorly educated parents.
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Economic capital also has an impact on the status-attainment process at each level of the parental background. Correlation coefficients show similar values around 0.260-0.295 in all groups but in the group of respondents whose parents hold a secondary-school final certificate. The final model was built in three steps. Model I. includes the effects of the basic socio-economic characteristics of the social background and those of some controls. (See Table 3 ). The results are in line with previous findings suggesting that both parental education and father's occupation play a notable role in shaping one's educational attainment. 10 The impact of parental education is not quite linear: children whose parents completed less than 8 years of school suffer especially while the difference between those whose parents have compulsory schooling and those whose have vocational schooling is practically negligible. Women lag behind men by about half year of schooling keeping their social background as well as their birth-cohort constant. The impact of the 5-year cohorts clearly shows the excessive expansion of the educational system and then the standstill of the process. Model II includes cultural and as well as the economic capital measures and also supports findings of previous research. Explanatory power of the model from Model I. is rising sharply (from 29.7 to 40.5%) indicating that cultural and economic assets contribute to the impact of social background to a considerable extent. Out of the two the impact of cultural capital is more notable: one unit increase in its amount results in an improvement of schooling more than twice as much as one unit increase in economic capital does. When the impact of the two forms of capital are included, the direct effect of the father's occupational prestige diminishes. This suggests that cultural and economic resources together transmit the full impact of the occupational prestige. 12 We can also observe that the impact of parental education falls sharply, but in this case the parameters remain statistically significant. Educational background has a cultural role in the first place: if economic capital is introduced in the model alone, its effect remains almost the same. Women remain disadvantaged in this model too, while cohort-effects get slightly stronger.
The final model (number III.) is aimed at answering the question whether it is cultural mobility or cultural reproduction that was more in effect in the 20th-century Hungary. Here 2x4 interaction effects were added to the measures previously introduced. The first four interactions that include cultural capital are for testing the major hypotheses. Taking respondents with an average level of cultural capital, born into a family where parents never completed elementary school as a reference group, the interaction effects show the cultural assets' impact on the education of children of (1) parents with compulsory schooling; (2) parents with vocational diploma; (3) parents with secondary final exam and (4) parents with higher education degree. The second set of interaction effects serves control purposes: it indicates the impact of economic assets on a similar way. Introducing interaction effects in the models results in no practical change in the proportion of total variance explained.
Parameters of the interaction effects that include cultural capital seem to support the model of cultural mobility -although not as clearly as it is suggested in the theory. Cultural capital has the strongest impact (beta=0.53) on the educational attainment of those whose parents have not completed compulsory schooling, therefore coming from the very bottom of social hierarchy. For this group, cultural activities provide an exceptional opportunity to compensate for other disadvantages. This mobilizing effect of cultural capital is significantly smaller even among those, whose parents have completed 8 years of compulsory school but did not study further (beta=0.44).
Less clear is the situation among children whose parents hold a vocational diploma. In their case impact of cultural capital does not seem to differ significantly from the impact it has among the least educated, although the difference is very close to being significant on a 5% level. (p=0.0510).
Finding that the impact of cultural capital becomes more moderate among those from the upper strata of the society again confirms the suggestions of the cultural mobility idea. Educational attainment of children, whose parents hold at least a secondary final exam appears to be less dependent on the extent to which their parents or the children themselves get involved in various cultural activities. Compared to those from the least educated groups there is a difference of 16-30 percentages in the impact of cultural capital.
13 Therefore we can conclude that in Hungary, cultural capital has a reproductive function as well as a mobilizing one, but it is the latter that is more significant. The findings clearly justify that -in Hungary at least -the "cultural mobility or cultural reproduction?" dilemma cannot simply be answered on an 'either-or' basis, and therefore can not be effectively investigated with a linear approach. Introducing a continuous measure of parental education into the model, its interaction effect with cultural capital would be significant and negative (beta=-2.662. p=0.08) suggesting that cultural capital has a mobilizing effect exclusively. However, our analysis has shown that cultural capital can indeed be utilized as a great mobilizing asset in the lowest strata of the society but at the same time it has a role -although somewhat weaker -in the reproduction of social inequalities, too.
Our model suggests that economic resources have a very similar impact on educational attainment at various levels of parental education. The only difference appears among those whose parents completed vocational schooling: in their case the importance of wealth seems to be somewhat below the average. All in all, material factors have a less significant impact on educational attainment than cultural factors do.
CHANGES OVER TIME
The question arises, whether the strong mobilizing effect of cultural capital at the bottom of the social hierarchy remains stable even when the hierarchy is continuously moving upwards. In the 1992 survey analyzed here, the proportion of those whose neither parent had completed compulsory schooling was as high as 74% in the oldest age-cohort, 22% among those born between 1957 and 1961 and only 13% in the youngest cohort. Looking at this tendency it is worthwhile asking the question whether at times of such a radical increase in the general level of education, the opportunity of social mobility through cultural investment will also move upwards, towards the somewhat more educated groups ("the new bottom of the hierarchy") or rather it will gradually diminish. This is a question we might be able to answer only if analyzing trends over time.
The cohorts in the sample spent their childhood in the broad and eventful period between 1940 and 1980. To investigate how the role of cultural capital in the status-attainment process had developed throughout these years, I estimated model III for three cohorts separately. The age groups distinguished in this part of the analysis are shown on the following table. 1942-1951 1956-1965 43.4% 3. cohort 852 1952-1967 1966-1981 22.7% Members of the first cohort spent their childhood during and after World War II, when the communist dictatorship was taking shape in the Eastern-European block. Those in cohort 2 were teenagers when the 1956 revolution in Hungary was followed by Review of Sociology 9 (2003) harsh reprisals and the one-party system was firmly established in the country. Finally, economic reforms had started and Kádár's socialism was at its peak when members of the 3rd cohort were at around the age of 14. One sign of the manifold changes in this 40-year time-period is the remarkable raise in the general level of education.
From the models estimated by age-cohorts (see Table 5 ) several interesting conclusions can be drawn. During the period investigated, women's disadvantage in education was in continuous decrease, although it did not fully vanish. Their disadvantage of 1.59 years in the beginning had fallen back to 0.34 years by the end of the period. In the impact of material resources on educational attainment a systematic but not very strong increase can be seen. However, throughout the time-period, cultural capital played a more important role than the economic factors. We can also identify a slight rise in the extent to which educational attainment is determined by the social background: the proportion of variance explained rose from 33.9 to 35.8 and then to 37.5% in the three cohorts.
Substantial changes over time can be seen with regard to our central problem of cultural mobility versus cultural reproduction as well. In the oldest cohort it is the mobilizing function of cultural capital that dominates. However, there seems to be no exceptional cultural impact among the least educated: cultural activities could equally well generate upward mobility among those whose parents did not and those whose parents did complete compulsory education, and also among those whose parents held a vocational school diploma (beta=0.55). Among those whose parents completed secondary school or even higher education the impact is substantially weaker (beta=0.55-0.17=0.38) or -according to the correlation coefficients (see Table 6 ) might even disappear. The findings however are not very reliable because of the low case numbers (n=22 with parents who completed secondary school and n=21 with graduated parents). Calculating the correlation coefficients for the merged categories, we get a coefficient 0.26 with p=0-094. which shows significance at the 10 per cent level. However, considering the size and importance of the parameter one cannot neglect this effect. On the basis of these I suggest the conclusion that until the mid-fifties, reproduction effect of cultural resources existed in Hungary, but in a fairly limited, moderate form only.
In the middle age-cohort, mobilizing effect remains dominant. During this time-period those with the least educated parents and those with parents holding a vocational school diploma could benefit exceptionally from additional cultural investments (beta=0.60). For children whose parents held a secondary final certificate the opportunities were similar. At the same time cultural effects were much weaker for those from the most educated families (beta=0.60-0.26=0.34). Correlation coefficients are positive and statistically significant in each group but among those whose parents held a higher education degree. The correlation coefficient in the second most educated group is positive and statistically significant and so is the correlation coefficient measured in the joint group of those with parents holding at least a secondary final certificate (r=0.35). These suggest that in order to transfer their privileges to their children, at the time of the one-party system's stabilization the upper classes started using their cultural assets to an increasing degree. However, the efficiency of this attempt could still not reach the efficiency cultural capital played in mobilizing children of the lower classes at these times.
By the time when members of the youngest cohort were teenagers, cultural effects ceased to being differentiated by social groups. Cultural resources had a very similar impact on education attainment in each group (beta=0-46). Strength of the reproductive function reaches that of the mobilizing affect: from the mid-sixties anyone -irrespective of social background -can expect very similar benefits from cultural investments. Table 5 . Model III, re-estimated by age-cohorts Born.: 1927 -1941 Born.: 1942 -1951 Born.: 1952 -1967 Mobility patterns of the twentieth-century Hungary and reproduction of the intellectual elite were carefully analyzed and described by Andorka (1990) . His analyses have shown that -although not to the extent ordinary but also professional discourses tend to assume -the intellectual elite indeed became socially rather closed between the fifties and the eighties in Hungary. According to Andorka, the reason for this was not so much that the discriminating educational policy against the intellectuals was withdrawn, as he found this policy to be ineffective anyway. Instead, he explains the tendency with the slowdown of the higher education's expansion and with the changes in the new generations' parental background. Competition for the intellectual positions became stronger and those from more educated backgrounds were becoming increasingly more successful in these circumstances than the less privileged ones.
With the help of the data presented here mechanisms behind the tendencies described by Andorka become clearer. The models indicate the strengthening of the reproductive function of cultural capital between the 1940s the 1980s. During this time, members of the elite gradually seized the ability of status-reproduction through the cultural assets. This gradual process then lead to the closeness of the upper groups found by Andorka.
Results from the present analysis can only be related to other research with care. Reasons for this are the differing methodology, most importantly the lack in other studies of looking at the impact of the various assets by social background, and also that in those parameters of cultural (and other) capitals were interpreted as the extent of reproduction. Therefore we can only make some careful remarks on the contradictory results found by Ganzeboom and his colleagues (1990) on the one hand and by Róbert (1991) on the other. As it was mentioned before, Ganzeboom found that the importance of cultural capital had been in continuous decrease in the twentieth-century Hungary. In contrast to this, Róbert suggests a tendency of slight increase. After having distinguished between the mobilizing and reproducing effects of cultural capital the picture found seems to be closer to the argument of Róbert. It is very likely that the decreasing tendency that was shown in the 1990s study had been due to the decrease in the mobilizing effect of the cultural assets rather than to any real decrease in the importance of cultural reproduction. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Our analyses have shown that cultural reproduction and cultural mobility were both present and played an important role in shaping the system of social inequalities Review of Sociology 9 (2003) in the 20th-century Hungary. Unlike in the Netherlands, where De Graaf and his colleagues found that educational attainments of the upper classes were almost independent of their cultural activities, cultural assets had high significance in Hungary also at the uppermost levels of the society. Even more notable is the compensatory affect for those with the least educated parents.
Relative importance of the two mechanisms went through substantial changes during the decades studied here. Until the mid-sixties inarguably the mobilizing role was more important. In fact at the time of World War II and in the years thereafter cultural capital held no reproductive function at all. Later on, higher classes accumulated more and more capability to transfer their cultural advantages into educational advantages. As a result of this, by the late sixties-early seventies, cultural activities played a very similar role in the educational attainment of children from any level of the society.
This way the analyses presented here provide a response to the dilemma of "cultural reproduction versus cultural mobility". Also, we have seen evidences concerning the changes in these processes over time. Of course open questions are remaining. Following De Graaf and his colleagues it would for example be interesting to distinguish between 'reading' and 'outgoing' type of cultural activities. They assume that verbal and language skills, acquirable through reading can be particularly important in small countries, where abilities to learn foreign languages are fundamental. On the other hand they accept that participating in the high culture as a whole can indeed be very beneficial in countries where these forms of culture are institutionalized in the university system -for example history and philosophy being among the most prominent fields of study (they cite the examples of Italy and France). In their analysis on Dutch data however, they successfully show the primary importance of reading habits and find that 'outgoing' cultural activities have no significant impact on educational attainment. A similar distinction was made in Hungary by Róbert (1991) in his study on cultural reproduction. Similar to the Dutch case, Róbert found that out of the various forms of cultural capital it is the reading habits that are the most influential on educational attainment. But -unlike in the case of De Graaf -in the study of Róbert also 'outgoing' cultural activities and private lessons proved to play some role. Beside the theoretical considerations also this 1991 study suggests that distinguishing between the various forms of cultural capital can be a fruitful direction of research in the field.
Distinguishing between cultural activities of the parents and those of the child could provide further possible refinement.
14 De Graaf and his colleagues argue that cultural activity during childhood can be influenced by the school-attainment of the child and also by the type of school attained and consequently, it is not an a priori component of the social origin. For these reasons they take only the parents' activities into account in their study. Although this is of course a plausible argument, there are various reasons why the child's activities should not be totally neglected. Firstly, respondents' memories are likely to be more reliable concerning their own childhood activities than the activities of their parents in that time. More importantly, attaining skills and abilities can be more successful through personal experiences than through activities of the parents -activities possibly observed but not personally practiced. I believe that using both sets of indicators in one index of cultural capital can both improve the reliability and the validity of the measure. By creating two separate indices from the two sets of activities on the other hand, the possibility would open to test also how the importance of the two relates to each other at the various levels of parental education. It is possible for example that upward-looking uneducated parents realizing the importance of cultural activities will motivate their children's cultural activities rather than changing their own habits in the first place. Accordingly, one would expect that parental cultural activity has more significance in the upper classes, in promoting reproduction of the social privileges, whilst the child's own activity has stronger impact in the lower strata of the society. Testing this hypothesis could again be a topic of further research.
Listing the possible relating research questions even further, one could mention the advantages of breaking educational career into 'decision points'. Instead of the simplifying method of considering each year of schooling equally useful and taking the number of years spent in school as the dependent variable, the decision of "study further or not?" could be investigated at the consecutive transition points of schooling separately. Previous studies have shown that the various factors of social origin influence the various stages of educational career to a differing extent and on different ways. (See for example Aschaffenburg and Maas 1997;  or for a Hungarian example Bukodi 1999) . One could hypothesize that the two alternative functions of cultural capital also have varying importance at the differing stages of this route.
As it can be seen, possible directions of further thinking are diverse. I hope that this analysis will convince members of the academic community that it can be useful not to only to look at new questions in the field but also to re-visit our previous research findings and to reflect: what it is that a distinction between reproductive and mobilizing function of cultural capital could add to our understanding on the dynamics of social structure.
